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ABSTRACT 
Studies of the relationships between property rights and technology adoption are 
complicated in several respects.  First, there are challenges involved in defining and 
measuring property rights and tenure security.  Second, there are several different valid 
purposes for undertaking such studies and each purpose may require a different approach.  
Third, there are a number of difficult theoretical and empirical issues involved in such 
studies, particularly in defining technology, identifying key dimensions of property 
rights, and accounting for the endogeneous determination of property rights. 
Through a synthesis and evaluation of previous studies, this paper identifies key 
issues and develops guidelines for conducting research on the relationships between 
property rights and technology adoption in smallholder agriculture.  It seeks to benefit 
researchers and policy makers wishing to undertake or interpret empirical research.  The 
topics addressed in the paper are: definition of scope and terms; key issues pertaining to 
the relationships between technology adoption and property rights variables; data 
collection and measurement issues; and analyses and interpretation of findings.  The 
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1.   OBJECTIVES AND RATIONALE 
The overall objective of this paper is to provide researchers and policy analysts 
with a better understanding of the key issues and guidelines for conducting research on 
the relationships between property rights and technology adoption in smallholder 
agriculture.  The primary target group for this paper is composed of researchers who have 
advanced training in micro-economic theory and statistics, but are not specialists in 
property rights per se.  An important secondary target group are policy analysts who 
review empirical studies and draw lessons for policy design.  
The study of property rights and technology is complicated in several respects.  
First, there are challenges involved in defining and measuring property rights and tenure 
security.  There now is general agreement that tenure security is related to a number of 
rights over land and other resources that may or may not be vested in individuals.  But 
there is no general agreement about how rights should be measured, aggregated, or 
otherwise manipulated to derive quantifiable measures of tenure security.   
Second, researchers can have several different reasons for undertaking a study of 
the relationship between property rights and technology adoption.  Each reason may have 
different implications for methodology. Perhaps the most common reasons are:  
1) providing input into discussions of property rights policy; 






3) identifying traits that will make new technology attractive to farmers; 
4) assessing the impacts of technology on objectives such as production and 
poverty alleviation; and 
5) identifying groups (e.g. women) that may not be able to adopt a technology 
because of the property rights institutions. 
Objective (1) suggests the need for a good dialog between researchers and policy 
makers (local or national) to ensure that the study will have a positive impact on the 
policy formulation process.  The other objectives imply closer collaboration with applied 
researchers, development institutions, and farmers themselves.   
Approaches to definition of property rights variables and modeling the causes and 
consequences of property rights also differ across the five objectives.  For objective (1), 
the results must have policy relevance.  That is, the analysis must involve variables that 
policy makers understand and can influence through the policy instruments under their 
control.  A clear structural model in which the effects of the policy variable(s) can be 
distinguished from other variables is required.  This structural model also needs to show 
the linkages between property rights and the other important outcome variables.  Policy 
makers are likely to be interested in the effects of property rights on technology adoption, 
productivity, sustainability, equity and income.  To fully address objectives (4) and (5) 
the researcher also needs a structural model that isolates the impacts of individual 
variables.  On the other hand, a cost-effective predictive model is needed to achieve 
objectives (2) and (3).  The research, extension and development agencies that use the 





can guide them in targeting new technologies.  In that case, they may be most interested 
in proxy variables that are easy to measure. 
The third challenge is that there are a number of difficult theoretical and empirical 
issues involved in such analyses.  Some of the major issues are: 
6) defining the technology, including the spatial and temporal dimensions of 
the costs, benefits, and scale of adoption; 
7) identifying the dimensions of property rights that have the greatest effects on 
technology adoption; 
8) selecting the appropriate level or levels of observation and analysis—plot, 
individual, farm, community; 
9) reducing potential biases in sampling; 
10) accounting for the endogenous determination of property rights; 
11) controlling for the confounding effects of property rights with other 
explanatory variables correlated with property rights; and 
12) making appropriate interpretations of the empirical results. 
As a result of these complicating factors, there have been several different 
approaches to empirical testing of the links between property rights and technology 
adoption.  Through a synthesis and evaluation of previous studies, this paper seeks to 
benefit those who wish to undertake or interpret empirical research in the future.  This paper 
does not develop a particular structural model of the relationship between property rights and 
technology adoption.  Instead, it draws upon models that have been recently developed by 





The remainder of the paper is as follows.  Section 2 briefly delineates the 
boundaries within which this review is organized.  Section 3 reviews key issues 
pertaining to modelling and conceptualizing technology adoption and property rights 
variables and the relationships between them.  Section 4 discusses specific data collection 
and measurement issues arising from Section 3.  Section 5 addresses some key aspects 
associated with analyses and interpretation of findings.  Finally, Section 6 is a re-
emphasis of the major issues and points raised in the paper. 
 
2.   SCOPE AND DEFINITIONS 
To enable this review to be tractable and thus useful, we have deliberately put 
some boundaries around different dimensions of the review. 
TECHNOLOGIES 
This paper will focus on the intensity of adoption and management of 
technologies by individuals for use on agricultural land.  Agricultural land includes home 
gardens, fields, fallow lands and grazing lands.  Collective adoption of technologies is not 
considered here.   
PROPERTY RIGHTS 
Property rights considered here are the rights of individuals to benefit streams 
produced from agricultural land (including all natural resources on the land).  We review 
literature relating to both customary and formal (e.g. statutory legal) tenure systems that 
affect smallholder farmers.  This includes the situations of legal pluralism in which 






The review concentrates on methods for empirical analysis rather than theoretical 
modelling.  Attention is given, however, to the links between theory and empirical 
analysis. 
GEOGRAPHIC SCOPE 
The methods reviewed should be relevant to smallholder agriculture in developing 
countries, especially where there is insecure social and legal support for customary and 
formal rights. 
 
3.   MODELLING AND HYPOTHESES 
It is noted above that the type of structural model that is developed to guide an 
empirical study depends upon the purpose of the study.  Some of the questions that need to 
be considered when developing a structural model are: 
￿ What characteristics of a technology suggest a relationship with property 
rights? 
￿ What aspects of technology adoption and use are most important to model and 
test? 
￿ What dimensions of property rights are important in the adoption decision?  
￿ How are property rights expected to affect technology adoption? 
￿ How is technology adoption hypothesized to affect property rights? 






￿ What are the most important social-spatial scales for the problem at hand?   
￿ What characteristics of a technology indicate a relationship with property 
rights? 
The nature of the technology or investment will affect the hypothesized 
relationships between technology adoption and property rights.  Technologies whose cost 
and benefit streams are of very short duration will be less affected by property rights than 
those whose benefit streams are lengthier.  Thus, a land manager who faces a high 
probability of losing her rights to land may still use fertilizer on her crops.  Other types of 
investments, though of a longer-term nature, may be undertaken if the costs of investment 
are very low.  This may be the case with the direct sowing of a small number of trees.  
For many other types of investment, such as terracing, fencing, water harvesting, 
windbreaks, and medium term fallowing, property rights are expected to have greater 
effects on incentives.  The extent of those effects will depend on the degree of insecurity.  
However, the effect of insecure tenure is not necessarily pervasive.  High expected profits 
can overcome the negative incentives that result from insecure property rights.   
The type of technology also affects whether or not it may have an impact on 
property rights.  Tree planting is widely cited as an investment that confers strong land 
rights to individuals (Fortmann and Bruce 1988; Suyanto et al. 1999; Snyder 1996; 
Baland et al. 1999).  Fallowing, on the other hand, is a type of land investment that may 
weaken land rights.  This may be because land that is left uncultivated can be perceived 
as excess to household needs and thus become subject to claims by other extended family 
members (Place and Otsuka 1998).  Investments in water wells and pumps may confer a 





may be subject to a myriad of secondary use rights by community members.  Many other 
types of investments may have little effect on property rights, particularly those with 
short duration.  
WHAT ASPECTS OF ADOPTION ARE IMPORTANT TO MODEL AND TEST? 
A few remarks about what constitutes “technology” and “adoption” are 
appropriate at this point.  Technology is often used broadly to encompass both 
physical/biological structures or objects as well as management practices.  Most often, 
researchers are interested in the adoption of specific technology components (e.g. 
fertilizer) or integrated technological packages (e.g. high yielding crop variety with 
fertilizer).  However, it may be more important to study the traits or functions of these 
technologies.  For example, rather than analyzing the adoption of all types of improved 
maize varieties or a particular variety, a study could be designed to examine the adoption 
of all short duration maize varieties.  Similarly, one might wish to study the adoption of 
trees, not by species, but by grouping together all species that farmers use to enhance soil 
fertility.  Grouping criteria will depend on one’s hypothesis about what function of a 
particular technology constitutes the underlying rationale for adoption.   
Generally, it is difficult to identify exactly when a technology has been adopted.  
Researchers instead often record current use of the technology.  This may be 
unsatisfactory for new technology where farmers may be merely experimenting or in 
areas where projects have had strong influence and possibly have provided incentives for 
farmers to use particular technologies.  Informal discussions and qualitative research can 





could be added to formal surveys to distinguish among different types of users of 
technology (see Section 4). 
Technology adoption is often measured by a single binary variable:  the 
technology is present or absent on a farm at a particular time.  A binary variable may be 
adequate for assessing farmer investment in, for example, traditional water wells.  There 
are five special characteristics of traditional water wells that lend themselves to this 
present/absent measurement.  First, traditional wells are very familiar to farmers and thus 
farmers are relatively certain about the associated payoffs and risks.  This implies that 
farmers are willing to make full rather than partial investments.  Second, farmers are 
usually not given any external incentive to make an investment in a traditional well so 
that one can assume it is demand driven.  Third, traditional wells are indivisible.  A 
farmer cannot choose to invest in half a well.  Fourth, traditional wells do not normally 
require complementary inputs in order to be functional and thus are independent of 
constraints associated with other technologies.  Lastly, once they have been built, wells 
exist for a long time, compared to technologies like crop varieties that come and go.  
However, researchers are usually interested in technologies that differ from 
traditional water wells in one or more of those four characteristics.  First, researchers are 
often interested in technologies that are under development or have been recently made 
available to farmers.  In those cases, it may be important to explore the farmers’ 
knowledge and information about the technology.  Does the farmer have accurate 
information about the technology?  Are there systematic biases in the information 
systems that limit access to information by certain types of farmers (e.g. women, 





separating the effects of information from the effects of property rights (Gladwin et al. 
1997). 
Second, new technologies are often made available to farmers in less developed 
countries through some type of adaptive research, extension or development project.  In 
that case, it is important to consider the amount of discretion that the farmer exercises 
over the investment.  Erroneous and misleading results can result from studies that 
confuse adoption with acquiescence to the wishes of researchers or extension workers.  
There are also farmers who test or use a technology solely because they may desire to 
copy other villagers or to obtain intangible benefits such as prestige from visits by 
researchers.  If possible, it is preferable to restrict studies of adoption behavior to farmers 
who do not have direct contact with such projects.  If not, then researchers should 
endeavor to account for this potential effect in the analysis.  
Third, it is often necessary to quantify the intensity of technology adoption 
beyond simple presence or absence of the technology on farm.  In this, there usually are 
tradeoffs between the benefits and costs of more refined measurement of the intensity of 
technology adoption.  For example, the adoption of trees can be measured by the number of 
trees per farm, the density of trees per hectare, the number of particular species or types of 
trees per hectare, or the standing biomass of trees per hectare, among others.  Where 
investments are divisible and relatively easy to make (like trees), a binary assessment of 
adoption may fail to detect important variation in technology adoption.  In this case, some 
type of further narrowing of the technology (say to certain species of trees) or 





Fourth, farmers often adopt components of technology packages in a stepwise 
manner, with some components necessarily pre-dating others. In that case the absence of 
a technology at a particular time may be unrelated to farmer plans to adopt the 
technology at a future time.  Equally, the absence of a technology at a particular time 
does not mean that the farmer has never used the technology. Again, decision tree 
modeling may be appropriate for understanding farmers’ strategies vis-à-vis the 
technology.  Based on this, the collection of historical data is valuable and may be 
warranted in some cases such as when there are clear relationships between technologies, or 
links between farming systems and technologies, or links between household life cycle and 
technology traits.  If indeed the duration were more relevant than current presence of a 
technology, this would suggest the use of survival or hazard models that deal explicitly with 
temporal issues.  In addition, complementary relationships between technologies would 
suggest the use of models that account for these relationships (e.g. multi-nomial logits). 
WHAT DIMENSIONS OF PROPERTY RIGHTS AFFECT ADOPTION?  
The literature suggests that the three important dimensions of property rights are 
exclusivity, security and transferability.  The exclusivity dimension refers to the way that 
relationships among potential right holders are defined.  Under open access, no one has 
rights or duties.  Under common property, rights are defined to coexist for an identified 
group, with other groups or individuals having duties to respect those rights.  Under 
communal property, rights of ownership are vested in groups, but rights of usufruct and 
limited rights of transfer may reside with individual households.  Under private property, 





property does not necessarily imply a high degree of exclusion.  In Africa, it is common 
for people to have secondary rights to the livestock feed, firewood and water produced on 
private land.   
Place et al. (1994) describe key components of tenure security to be freedom from 
interference from outside sources, continuous use, and ability to reap the benefits of labor 
and capital invested in the resource.  Embedded in this description are three dimensions 
of land rights: breadth, duration, and assurance.  Breadth refers to the types of rights held.  
Generally the more rights held the more secure those rights.  Households with rights to 
alienate land or to make long-term improvements on land would be considered to be 
more secure than those with only use rights to land.  However, there often are certain 
rights, such as the right to bequeath, that are critical to motivate long-term investment.  
Some rights may be indicative of larger bundles of rights.  For example, someone who 
holds the right to sell may automatically hold the right to rent out.  Duration refers to the 
length of time over which the individual/group may enjoy specific rights.  Assurance 
refers to the ability of individuals to exercise their rights.  Despite adequate breadth and 
duration of rights, assurance may be lacking where overlapping rights exist or where 
there is weak enforcement of rights.  
Transferability refers to the ability of the right holder to transfer rights over the 
resource to others.  Primary examples of this include the ability to select heirs and 
bequeath land, the ability to rent or lease land or trees to others temporarily, and the 
ability to dispose (alienate) an asset.  Transferability is valuable by increasing the ability 
to raise cash through sale or rental of the property (also through credit) and by allowing 





HOW ARE PROPERTY RIGHTS HYPOTHESIZED TO AFFECT TECHNOLOGY 
ADOPTION? 
It is generally accepted that, at least in sub-Saharan Africa, there are both direct 
and feedback relationships between property rights and technology adoption.  First, the 
property rights that govern the use of a particular plot of land will affect farmers’ 
adoption and use of technology on that land.  Second, the adoption and use of technology 
has feedback effects on property rights.  Some of these feedbacks occur within a prevailing 
property rights institution.  Others put pressure on the property rights institution to change.  
This sub-section is concerned with the direct effects of property rights on technology 
adoption.  The following sub-section is concerned with the feedback effects. 
Exclusivity 
Property rights that are generally regarded as being ‘private’ may confer rights to 
individuals, nuclear families or lineages.  Private property rights may also be encumbered 
by secondary rights or public restrictions.  It is generally hypothesized that the degree of 
exclusivity has a positive effect on the incentive to produce, invest and adopt technology.  
The greater the exclusivity, the greater is the incentive to adopt technologies that are 
fixed to the land.  Thus, for example, institutionalized seasonal grazing of farm land (lack 
of exclusivity) may discourage certain types of investment such as the planting of 
perennial crops.  However, free grazing livestock may well encourage investment in 
fencing and adoption of non-palatable plants and trees.  Also, Baland and Platteau (1996) 
suggest that there may be circumstances in which less exclusive land rights may help 







Feder and Feeny (1993) distinguish different possible effects of insecure property 
rights on technology adoption.  First, rights of short duration provide a direct disincentive 
for farmers’ to undertake investments in land.  Relatedly, when the breadth or assurance 
of rights are inadequate, local rules may not protect an individual’s claim to benefits from 
investments. This has often been noted in the case of women, who lack rights to 
undertake long-term investments (Kerkhof and May 1988, McLain 1992; Place 1995; 
Mugo 1999; for trees).  Whether breadth or assurance is hypothesized to be linked to 
technology adoption depends upon the specific technology/property rights context such as 
the payback period of the technology.   Second, insecure property rights will increase the 
relative price of long-term assets to land and thus reduce the capital intensity of farming.   
Transferability 
The transferability of land rights, including rental, bequest, temporary and 
permanent gift, and sale, may affect technology adoption in three ways.  First, restrictions 
on transferability may reduce the incentives of current residents to adopt technologies 
likely to generate benefits beyond their likely tenure.  For example, if an elderly man 
cannot pass a piece of land to his heirs, then he is likely to exploit existing trees rather 
than plant new trees.  In this case there is a clear interaction between property rights and 
life cycle of the household.  Second, restrictions on transferability are likely to reduce the 
market exchange of land and thus may affect the efficiency of land allocation. 
Households with most incentive to undertake investments on certain land types will thus 
have limited access to that land.  As a consequence, it might be expected that land that is 





expect a greater level of technology adoption in communities where rights to sell land 
were more prevalent.  Third, restrictions on transferability will reduce the possible use of 
land as collateral.  In theory, land is the most important collateral asset in rural areas.  
However, it is only valuable to potential lenders to the extent that it can be sold by lenders 
to third parties, in case of default.  In many parts of Sub-Saharan Africa, it is difficult to sell 
land, particularly to people from outside the community.  As noted above, the importance 
of specific transfer rights in a given area depends on whether such rights are exercised. 
HOW IS TECHNOLOGY ADOPTION HYPOTHESIZED TO AFFECT PROPERTY 
RIGHTS? 
There are two possible types of feedback effects between technology adoption 
and property rights.  First, an existing property rights institution may provide a farmer 
with different types of property rights to a particular plot of land (in terms of exclusivity, 
security and transferability) depending upon their investment in that plot.  For example, 
qualitative studies have documented the ability of certain investments, such as in land 
clearing and tree planting, to enhance tenure security (e.g. Snyder 1996; Quisumbing et 
al. 1999).  The expectation of more secure property rights may thus stimulate farmers to 
undertake certain investments (see for Uganda, Place and Otsuka 1999 and Baland et al. 
1999; for Burkina Faso see Braselle et al. 1998).  More research is needed to assess the 
temporal duration of this effect and to assess the aspects of tenure security that can be 
expected to change following such investments.  
Second, the adoption of certain types of technology may result in pressure on 
property rights institutions to change.  For example, recognition of investment in trees 





adoption of improved fallows by a few thousand farmers prompted the Paramount Chief 
to pass a new bylaw to that prohibits free grazing of livestock (personal communication 
with Chief, October 1998).  In Kabale, Uganda, secondary grazing rights continue, but 
there are now strict fines for damage to young trees planted by households.  The 
introduction of certain technologies can also modify rights of women over resources.  For 
instance, women who were not allowed to plant timber and pole trees by their husbands 
were allowed to plant trees for soil fertility in Uganda, as these were considered to be 
different types of trees (personal communication, Two Wings Agroforestry Group 1996). 
If property rights variables are likely to be treated as dependent variables, then 
one must try to identify variables that would influence changes or differences in observed 
values and plan for the collection of those data.  Furthermore, if property rights and 
technology variables influence each other, then it is important to construct an appropriate 
structural model to account for these relationships.  This can be complicated by multiple 
scale considerations.  For example, property rights institutions may prevail at the level of 
a community or ethnic group whereas technology adoption may be an individual 
decision.  This may call for the integration of community and household level studies.  
Whether at multiple or single scales, multiple-equation systems should be specified.  In a 
simultaneous system, one must identify, measure, and include variables that can help to 
identify the equations.  Often, this comes down to identifying an explanatory variable that 






ARE PROPERTY RIGHTS VARIABLES CORRELATED WITH OTHER 
VARIABLES THAT AFFECT ADOPTION? 
There are strong theoretical reasons to believe that some property rights variables 
are correlated with other variables that may be directly related to technology adoption.  
At an individual level, women and men may differ systematically with respect to the 
ways they can acquire rights to land and the subsequent rights they enjoy to this land.  
For instance, women may tend to rely more on temporary land acquisitions and therefore 
have less secure rights to land than men.  In this case, a tenure variable related to 
acquisition or land rights may capture other gender-differentiated impacts.  Other 
variables that may be related to property rights variables at the plot or household level 
might be wealth (e.g. wealthier household may have stronger rights to land), soil fertility 
(purchased parcels may be of better quality), and distance from house to parcel (closer 
parcels may be more secure).  At the community level, there may be systematic relationships 
between property rights and population pressure and distance to market.  Theory suggests 
that individualization of land rights strengthens under greater population pressure and 
proximity to developing markets by virtue of heightened competition for land and higher 
returns brought on by better access to markets.  The presence of such correlations suggests 
more complicated structural models with multiple equations.  This means that strategies for 
sampling and data collection will have to be modified accordingly.  
If multicollinearity is anticipated, then it is important to explore theoretically the 
relationships between property rights and other explanatory variables.  Otherwise, 
misspecification of the model can lead to erroneous conclusions about the importance of 





transmitted entirely through indirect effects on farm size and tenure security.  If this is the 
case, then the inclusion of gender, farm size, and tenure security in a single equation 
model would show gender to be insignificant.  But if a structural model was well thought 
out, the effect of gender might emerge as significant in a reduced form regression.  
Adjusting the original model will likely imply the collection of additional variables that 
might be used to help identify equations of a more complex model.  All these concerns 
are lessened, however, if the objective is only a predictive model.  In this case, 
identifying inexpensive variables associated with adoption takes priority over teasing out 
the causal relationships among individual variables. 
ARE THERE DIMENSIONS OF THE PROBLEM THAT ARE RESOLVED AT 
DIFFERENT SOCIAL-SPATIAL SCALES (PLOT, INDIVIDUAL, FARM, 
COMMUNITY)? 
With respect to social and spatial scales, two dimensions are important.  The first 
pertains to the right holder(s) and the second to the resource unit.  Right holders could be 
individuals, households, pastoralists, user groups, communities, and the like.  Resource 
units could be individual trees, wells, and various land units such as forests, pastures, 
agricultural parcels, or fields within parcels.  There is no single unit(s) of observation that 
is best nor even appropriate to address all tenure issues.  The best unit(s) of observation 
will vary according to the particular issue under study.  Most of the empirical studies 
dealing with property rights and technology adoption use households or individual 
household members as key right holders and land parcels or fields as the main resource 





How can one best select the appropriate units?  Perhaps it is best to indicate the 
types of cases where the standard practice of using the household right holder/land parcel 
resource combination may not be the most appropriate.  One is the issue of how rights of 
women may affect technology adoption.  Using the household as the key right holder unit 
will only be able to compare the cases of female-headed and male-headed households.  
Obtaining information for all male and female adults within a household is most effective 
to look at intra-household distinctions (see Golan 1994; Mugo 1999).  Moreover, 
women’s rights over land may not identical across the entire farm.  Women may enjoy 
more secure rights over specific plots of land than others.  These subtleties must be 
understood prior to the analysis of the more complex tenure issues.  Other cases requiring 
special attention to unit of observation are:  trees may have to be differentiated according 
to species or function; higher level tenure variables that are uniform for many households 
within a defined area; where there is significant fragmentation of landholdings; resources 
that are shared by households. 
Though these cases suggest that there may be a superior strategy for selecting 
units of observation, it should be stressed that conducting analyses at multiple units of 
observation can yield different insights into the property rights-technology adoption 
relationships.  In some cases, the use of a single observational unit may lead to erroneous 
conclusions.  For example, a farm level analysis could mask many important relationships 
taking place on different land parcels or fields where rights may differ.  On the other hand, 
focusing only on the smaller units can sometimes lose sight of the broader implications of 
tenure on household level decision-making.  For instance, many studies have found negative 





level analyses.  However, this may obscure effects such as the effect renting land might have 
on enabling households to make longer term plans on their owned parcels.  Therefore, 
one should always consider whether the units of observation selected would lead to 
unambiguous answers to the key questions being studied. 
The most common right holder studied in property rights studies is that of the 
household.  These studies begin with the assumption that most decisions concerning 
agricultural investment and technology adoption are made at the household level, 
normally by the head of household.  Following from this, property rights over a specific 
resource are treated as uniform for the household, bearing the property rights of the 
household head.  These approaches are well accepted in the literature and therefore are 
generally well founded to study certain issues.  For example, focusing on the rights of the 
household head in a study of the effect of the right to sell land on technology adoption is 
quite sensible.  Sales cannot be initiated by other members of the household or 
community.  In such studies, the most common resource units are farms or plots.  It is 
now well recognized that in many rural settings, households may acquire more than one 
plot of land using different methods of acquisition.  Furthermore, rights of a particular 
household member over these plots could differ.  Therefore, it is now routine to collect 
property rights information at plot level. 
Studies at the individual (i.e. household member) level are intended primarily to 
look at the implications of gender on technology adoption.  One of the key differences 
between males and females is in their control and access to resources and the benefits 
streams they produce.  Thus, a key feature of these studies is to look at gender differences 





management in general, and technology adoption in particular.  Studies that account for 
individual difference also often are cognizant of the possibility for finding different 
property rights arrangements across plots.  For instance, wives may have more control over 
decisions in one plot than on the rest of the farm and property rights studies may focus on the 
question of whether this asymmetry leads to difference in technology adoption. 
Studies at the community level are rare.  This is due in large part to the 
observation that agricultural land is managed directly by smaller units and as such the 
smaller units are more pure observational units.  But another reason may be related to 
measurement problems: how can one accurately measure technology adoption at the 
community level?  What property rights variables are appropriate at the community level 
and which can be measured?  But increasingly, the power of such studies is being 
recognized (Pender et al. 1998; Suyanto et al. 1999; Baland et al. 1999; Place and Otsuka, 
2000;).  Community level studies are ideal for examining property rights aspects that tend 
not to vary over smaller units or areas.  Those that may be linked to ethnicity, such as 
grazing practices, land acquisition methods, and the rights of women, may be quite 
variable across communities, but vary little within communities.  Community level 
studies enable researchers to study wider areas for less financial cost.  The drawback is in 
the compromises that must be made in terms of precision of data.  Moving to higher 
levels of aggregation brings even more difficulties in conceptualizing meaningful 
technology adoption and property rights variables.  Often the aggregation of very diverse 
intra-national variation in these variables renders a national level analysis weak.  
However, some innovative work has taken place at the national level, at least in 





4.   DATA COLLECTION AND MEASUREMENT 
In collecting data, some iteration between individual and group interviews and 
between qualitative and quantitative research techniques is usually appropriate.  
Qualitative techniques are used to identify priority issues for study, determine the 
population to be considered in the study, identify variables for stratifying the population, 
identify local definitions of property rights, determine the sensitivity of the questions, and 
interpret quantitative results.  Quantitative techniques (including quantification through 
participatory techniques) are used to validate qualitative results, statistically test 
hypotheses, estimate elasticities and prioritize policy and action steps.  
POPULATION AND SAMPLING STRATEGY 
Several issues need to be considered early in a study of this type.  Once the 
specific technology(s) is defined, it is important first to define the population from which 
a sample may be targeted for further analysis.  Then a sampling scheme must be devised.  
Lastly, one must decide whether the observations drawn should be georeferenced in order 
to be able to relate observations at different spatial locations and scales.  
Population 
Identifying the population on which to base a sample for a study of a property 
rights-technology adoption study can be challenging.  It is less of a concern when the 
study is focused on adoption or impact of a specific technology in which case the 
researcher is confined to defining the population from within the feasible adoption 
domain (e.g. an area surrounding the points of technology dissemination).  This will 





is necessary to examine the technology-property relationship from either direction.  It is 
more of a difficulty for a researcher who wishes to identify representative property rights 
systems, as detailed information about property rights is not generally available across 
large areas.  A further problem is that there can be peculiar property rights institutions 
based on ethnicity and this will affect the degree to which specific empirical results may 
be generalized.  Nonetheless, there is a great deal of dispersed qualitative information 
about property rights systems and these can be exploited to assist in developing study 
populations.  Rather than being overwhelmed with the nuances distinguishing different 
property rights systems, classification on specific characteristics or incentives may be 
more fruitful in delineating pathways for extrapolating results.  
Sampling 
Once the population is defined, the next step is to develop a sampling scheme.  
Among the first issues to address is that of unit of observation.  Given that this is the 
focus of the above section on social-spatial scales, this discussion is postponed to the 
corresponding empirical section on measuring property rights at aggregate levels.  
Regardless of the unit of observation, when the purpose of the study is to examine factors 
affecting technology adoption or impact, it is essential to have a sufficient number of 
adopter and non-adopter outcomes in the sample. From a statistical perspective, ensuring 
a reasonable number of cases for each outcome improves the ability to find statistical and 
reliable links between factors and different outcomes by reducing standard errors and 
influence of outliers.  
Whether the sampling procedure should be random or stratified depends on the 





planned (say over 1,000), then sufficient numbers of adopters and non-adopters might be 
found from a random sample, even if adoption rates are relatively low, say between 10–
20 percent.  More frequently, studies can only afford smaller samples in the range of 
100–200 households.  For technologies that are used by a large proportion of the 
population, a random sample of households/individuals may suffice.  However, for new 
technologies with limited exposure, stratification of specific geographical areas, if not 
households themselves, may be necessary.  The implication of non-random sampling is that 
there is over-sampling of areas where the technology has been introduced.  The 
implications of this on interpretation and extrapolation are important and are discussed in 
Section 5. 
Most studies of technology adoption have not stratified households on the basis of 
property rights variables.  The first reason is that it is not always possible to obtain 
sufficient information on property rights with which to stratify.  Second, if property rights 
variables are endogenous, such stratification can lead to econometric complications in 
terms of model misspecifications and omitted variable biases.  Third, important 
categories of property rights will be automatically included if the sample is sufficiently 
large and not too narrow geographically.  An indirect way to obtain a representation of 
different tenure arrangements would be to stratify on the basis of ethnic group and 
population pressure or any other variable that is available and is related to property rights 
variables (e.g. Place and Otsuka 1998; Baland et al. 1999).  Where such techniques are 
inadequate and secondary data is not available, rapid censuses have been found to helpful 






Georeferencing is a technique to improve the ability to relate locations of study 
units to one another and to other phenomenon in the landscape, such as towns or roads.  
To the extent that aggregations of phenomenon and distances to key physical or 
manmade structures are important in creating incentives for behavior, analyses can be 
improved by using georeferencing.  Georeferencing should definitely be used in 
community level studies, where primary data collection can be easily linked to other 
variables likely to differ across communities.  Georeferencing may be less important for 
studies at lower levels (because information on other variables may be too coarse to vary at 
these levels), but an exception is the creation of variables of aggregation (pockets of like 
households, areas of similar land characteristics) or measures of dispersion (fragmentation 
of household plots).  A cost-benefit analysis of georeferencing should be undertaken as part 
of the planning of the study. 
MEASUREMENT OF TECHNOLOGY ADOPTION 
First, we consider the identification of ‘real’ adoption.  This is especially relevant 
to the CGIAR where there is pressure to demonstrate impact from their research.  
Farmers may undertake rather lengthy experimental processes before deciding whether to 
adopt a technology.  An understanding of recent technology expansion is helpful in 
distinguishing testers from adopters.  An adopter may be one who has expanded the level 
of use over a number of years. Spending some time to understand these differences is 
most critical for researchers unfamiliar with an area or technology. 
The most common form of measuring technology adoption is through the use of a 





unanswered questions about how the technology found its way onto the field.  Was it 
demand-driven or were farmers rewarded for trying it?  This approach also crudely places 
observations into one of two categories and may result in grouping of households with 
quite dissimilar behavior.  For instance, a household that has planted 1 tree may be 
treated as equal to the household that has planted 1,000 trees.  A binary measure works 
better for larger more indivisible investments such as a well or the formation of a bench 
terrace.  Whether simple binary measures or more quantitative assessments are made, it is 
important to verify that wilful investments were made.  Variants on the use of binary 
measurements are to incorporate into criteria for adoption evidence of prior expansion or 
willingness to expand in the future (e.g. Manyong and Houndekon 1999).  
If investment levels are well distributed, using a binary measure results in 
considerable loss of information.  As a consequence, the statistical relationship between 
property rights and investment may differ fundamentally in the cases of binary and 
quantitative measure of investment.  Likewise, it becomes more difficult to isolate the 
impact of property rights from other possible explanatory variables.  Another concern 
emerges in regression analysis.  First, because property rights variables are themselves 
often represented by discrete variables, there is a chance that regression models will not 
converge.  This probability increases the more unbalanced are the frequencies of adoption 
and property rights.  
When measuring technology adoption, it is often easy to scale up to higher levels.  
For instance, with a measure of plot level technology adoption, a similar variable can be 
created at a household level or a community level (given that suitable sampling methods 





aggregated to form a community variable on the percentage of plots or households with 
terraces. 
Quantifying the level of adoption is used in some cases (see Lin 1991; Bellon and 
Taylor 1993; and Adesina and Zinnah 1993 for examples).  Some examples of 
quantifying adoption would be the meters of similar types of conservation strips, meters 
of live fencing, and area under a particular tree crop.  However, there are challenges to 
the quantification of adoption including the evaluation of the quality of the technological 
investment.  A terrace bund formed by earth, vegetative strips, and stone is technically 
superior to that formed by earth alone.  In this case, comparison of ‘meters under terrace’ 
would not provide an appropriate measure of intensity of adoption.  Some investments 
are more easily quantified, e.g. the number of trees planted, but here too quantifying can 
become costly if there are many different tree species to condition upon and if within 
each, there were many different dates of planting.  There are trade-offs between precision 
and cost.  Certain cases suggest that further precision is more important.  If property 
rights are expected to have very specific impacts, say on a particular type of tree rather 
than trees in general, then all trees cannot be grouped together.  This is true in the case of 
timber trees in Uganda (Place 1995).  On the other hand, one shouldn’t undertake an 
exercise of mining the data to find any type of relationship.  Focusing on narrow 
definitions rather than the bigger picture can lead to erroneous conclusions.   
If duration of an investment or the date of investment is important to measure, this 
is usually relatively easy to collect at the plot or household levels.  For some types of 
technologies, e.g. the use of a particular crop variety or management practice, it may 





adoption is practically impossible.  Instead, one might need to settle with first dates of 
technology adoption, which is achievable, though average duration among those who adopt is 
more easily understood.  A survey could thus be modified not merely to tick whether a 
technology is present or not, but whether it had ever been present and when.  This can 
provide the necessary information to investigate adoption rates between two points in time 
(e.g. Knudsen 1991; and Fischer et al. 1996) or sequential adoption of related 
technologies or components (e.g. Feder 1982).  
There are two additional points here. The first is that a technology that is observed 
may well have been inherited (especially something such as tree crops) and an 
understanding of what was already present on the land at the time of inheritance is very 
important.  For example, there may be quite perverse effects where only the current stock 
of trees is measured.  A farmer with a relatively high current level may in fact have 
inherited a much larger number of trees and has only reduced his density.  Meanwhile 
another farmer with a low current number of trees could have started with none and 
planted all those observed.  Second, if technology adoption had in fact taken place several 
years prior to the survey, then it may be wise to attempt to match property rights and 
other explanatory variables as much as possible to the conditions at the time of adoption.  
MEASUREMENT OF PROPERTY RIGHTS   
The concepts of exclusivity, security, and transferability are often captured 
empirically through various measures of rights to resources.  Exclusivity has been 
proxied for by responses to questions on the necessity of households or individuals to 





household prior to exercising a right (see Migot-Adholla et al. 1991).  Excludability may 
also be proxied by collecting information about the extent of secondary rights to 
resources.  This is very pertinent for community level surveys to gain an understanding of 
the general level of excludability of rights.  The particular context of the technology-
property rights issue will suggest the specific types of rights or approval mechanisms that 
are more appropriate.  
Security has been approached in several different ways.  One common way is to 
capture the breadth or number of rights held by individuals (Migot-Adholla et al. 1991; 
Besley 1995; Hayes et al. 1997; Braselle et al. 1998).  Others have identified hierarchies 
of land rights and then measured the presence or absence of key land rights (Migot-
Adholla et al. 1991; Hayes et al. 1997; Baland et al. 1999). This approach is appropriate 
if, from the perspective of the respondents, some rights are more important than others or 
if possession of more powerful rights implies possession of many less powerful rights 
(Schlager and Ostrom 1992). Another common approach is to use the method of 
acquisition or local tenure categories as a proxy for tenure security (Matlon 1994; Gavian 
and Fafchamps 1996; Ayuk 1997; Adesina 1999; Manyong and Houndekon 1999).  
Normally, purchased land is hypothesized to be most secure, rented and leased land the 
least secure, with other types of acquisitions lying somewhere between.  Some studies 
have endeavored to differentiate categories that contain a large proportion of cases.  For 
instance, Lawry and Steinbarger (1991) and Adesina (1999) distinguished between 
divided and undivided inheritance acquisition methods.  Likewise, Place and Otsuka 
(1998) distinguished four different inheritance patterns among the patrilineal and 





their perceptions of the risks of losing land (e.g. Kisamba-Mugerwa and Barrows 1989).  
Informal discussions in the study area assist greatly in the identification of important 
tenure security groupings. 
Transferability is almost always measured either by the right to sell land, rent 
land, or by the presence of land title (Feder et al. 1988).  Whether these are useful 
variables to distinguish different degrees of transferability can be evaluated by obtaining 
information about the prevalence of land market transactions.  For example, if few land 
sales take place, it is not clear that the right to sell is linked strongly to transferability per 
se.  Information about rights to sell and rent can be obtained rather easily, but care should 
be taken to understand the degree to which individuals can make free and independent 
decisions.  Often, extended families or elders must approve sales.  In some societies, land 
must first be offered to members of one’s extended family before it can be placed on the 
open market.  The presence of land title or any other formal document (e.g. purchase 
agreement) is also easy to enumerate.  In the case of title, because updating land registers 
following land transfers is often an endogenous choice of farmers, titles to land are 
sometimes outdated, being in the name of the previous owner, often the father.  The 
separation between titleholder and user may not mean much in terms of tenure security, but 
it may have an important implication for the ability of the user to transfer land. 
There are a group of variables that are often described as components of land 
tenure, though they are not directly linked to security or rights.  These are variables that 
describe land holdings patterns, such as plot size, farm size, distance between homesteads 
and plots, and fragmentation (or scattering) of plots.  For the size variables, the data 





where land surveys have been done, their knowledge is normally quite accurate.  In other 
areas, there may be significant errors in estimation.  It is advisable to collect information 
on total farm size and to check this with information (or direct measurements) of 
individual plots or fields.  Distance between the homestead and specific plots is fairly 
easy to collect, be it in by space (e.g. kilometers) or time (e.g. minutes of walking time).  
Growing population pressure has led to increasing fragmentation of farm holdings in 
some areas.  Farmers might therefore operate one or more inherited plots, one or more 
purchased plots, and one or more rented plots at the same time.  Farm fragmentation as a 
variable could be measured by the number of plots or by more sophisticated measures 
that take into account the size of plots or the distances between them (e.g. dispersion 
indices can be used—see Blarel et al. 1992). 
While these proxies of tenure security are important in understanding the 
fundamental links between property rights and technology adoption (see Haugerud 1989; 
Blarel et al. 1992; Carter et al. 1994; and Place and Hazell 1993), they are often not 
variables over which formal policy makers have direct influence.  There may be 
additional legal property rights instruments for which an analysis might be quite important.  
For instance, a very relevant research issue would be the impact of the issuance of formal 
titles to land on investment and agricultural productivity.  The impact of title has been 
tested by several authors (Feder et al. 1988; Roth et al. 1994; Pinckney and Kimuyu 1994; 
Alston et al. 1996; and Place and Migot-Adholla 1998) and reviewed by Atwood (1990).  
Other legal instruments that have appeared in empirical research include contracts with the 





Three issues regarding the method of data collection are of particular relevance to 
property rights studies.  First, some types of topics or questions are believed to be quite 
sensitive to respondents.  This should be first investigated in more informal discussions 
by the researchers.  However, considering the wide variety of information on property 
rights reported in the literature, such concerns do not appear to be widely validated.  
Second, concepts of tenure security and rights are not so straightforward to articulate in 
questionnaires.  For instance there may be confusion over the distinction between what 
rights may be exercised versus what rights are commonly exercised.  This is problematic 
both for enumerators and respondents and researchers should prepare for considerable 
training on these this topic. Third, not all types of respondents are equally informed of 
property rights issues.  Often, it is the male head of household who is best able to respond 
about household level rights and details of acquisition methods.  In fact, if the head is a 
male, the wife may not be willing to divulge detailed information about property rights.  
On the other hand, in studies of individual household members rights, it is recommended 
to seek responses from the particular individuals concerned rather than accepting 
responses from a single respondent.  The same principles apply in community studies; it 
is important to identify respondents with appropriate knowledge of the subject while still 
capturing the varied viewpoints of different stakeholders.  
TIMING OF STUDY RELATIVE TO TIME PERIODS OF ADOPTION AND 
REALIZATION OF PAYOFFS FROM ADOPTION 
The different reasons for conducting a study of property rights and technology 
adoption can imply different timings for the study.  Organizations that wish to identify 





studies conducted during early stages of technology dissemination.  The feedback of 
information from these studies can prevent wasted resources.  Studies that are more 
geared towards influencing policy are best served by allowing technology development 
and transfer processes to mature for a longer period.  In studying the impact of technology, 
there are benefits from studies implemented at different times.  Early studies can identify 
improvements to feedback into the research process, while late studies can give better 
assessments of overall impact.  In all cases, it is important to be sure that farmers are 
beyond an early testing phase. 
If the study is seeking to look at the influence of technology adoption on property 
rights change, then a longer time frame is clearly warranted since such institutions cannot 
be expected to change rapidly.  Moreover, it may be that only after widespread 
technology adoption would there be sufficient pressure on institutions to change. 
Measuring the feedback of technology adoption on property rights   
If technology adoption is expected to affect property rights variables, a couple of 
important data collection issues arise.  First, it is best to be able to document a change in 
property rights from one point in time to another.  For a plot, this might be from the time 
of acquisition or the period just prior to the adoption of technology, to the current period.  
The variable(s) selected to represent property rights must be such that they are not static 
(so method of plot acquisition would not be appropriate) and can be relatively easily 
recalled by respondents.  The second issue concerns the ability to distinguish the property 
rights-technology adoption link from the technology adoption-property rights link.  To 
some extent this means understanding the temporal processes involved.  But there may 





variables that might affect one of the links but not the other so as to be able to identify the 
parameters associated with the different directional relationships.   
Some examples of variables and their likely impact on the property rights-
technology adoption complex are:  
Those affecting adoption only:  
￿ household size, size of family labour force, certain plot biophysical  
￿ characteristics (plot size, slope) 
Those affecting property rights only:  
￿ ethnic group, leadership & community political variables 
Those affecting both:   
￿ farm size, marital status of household, age of head, gender of head 
These are not fixed nor defensible in all cases.  They must be developed for the 
particular situation under study. 
DATA COLLECTION WHEN EXPLANATORY VARIABLES ARE EXPECTED TO 
BE CORRELATED 
When correlations between property rights and other explanatory variables are 
probable, then adjustments to data collection may be in order.  Examples include land 
titles and farm size (Carter et al. 1994) and gender and mode of land acquisition (de 
Zeeuw 1997 and Manyong and Houndekon 1999).  One of the best ways to identify the 
influence of the property rights variable(s) from others is through sampling strategies.  
The goal is to have a sufficient variation in the sample so that there are adequate numbers 
of cases contrary to the systematic correlations (e.g. women with strong rights or low 





However, a priori, it can be exorbitantly costly to design a sampling frame to achieve 
this.  One remedy is to increase the size of the sample in order to increase the number of 
different interactions among the independent variables.  Increasing the sample size has 
long been known as one of the best ways to mitigate against multicollinearity problems.  
If multicollinearity is recognized only at the data analysis stage another option is to do 
some informal, quick, and inexpensive data collection to distinguish real driving factors 
from symptomatic variables (e.g. to solicit expert opinion from key informants from a 
village).  If all these methods are unavailable, then the researcher can apply some of the 
econometric techniques available to deal with multicollinearity such as ridge regression 
(Goldberger 1990). 
MEASURING PROPERTY RIGHTS AT MORE AGGREGATE LEVELS OF 
OBSERVATION 
The section reviewing measurement of property rights at the plot and household 
levels showed that at the purest level of specific resource and specific right holder, very 
detailed assessment and precise measure of property rights can be made.  At higher 
levels, such as a community, information will be collected from spokespersons on behalf 
of the community leading to some fundamental differences in the quality of information.  
This means that the information will be subject to less detail, for example averages are 
reported and the rich variation in property rights systems are lost.  There may also be less 
accuracy in reporting.  Thus, some property rights arrangements could be reported to be 
much more important than what actually occurs in practice.  Collecting reliable 
information at community level can be challenging.  It is of course good practice to 





variety of tenure arrangements.  Older people will be the key resource people for 
obtaining historical information.  In some cases, it may be necessary to build up 
community level property rights variables from rapid surveys of households in order to 
be assured of reliable data (Suyanto et al. 1999).  Participatory tools may be used to help 
obtain more precise property rights variables.  For instance, for variables that are highly 
related to spatial location (e.g. extent of commons, area under broad tenure regime such 
as customary versus estate), respondents might be able to draw boundaries on maps allowing 
for more accurate assessment of the importance of different tenure arrangements.  If the 
boundaries are subsequently stored in a GIS database, the tenure variables can be linked to a 
host of other information similarly stored (Place and Otsuka 2000). 
 
5.   ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION 
This section will explore alternative statistical/econometric techniques used as 
well as the interpretation of the results for research and policy. 
There are at least three important components of the statistical analysis:  
￿ investigation of statistical significance of a relationship  
￿ investigation of the importance of a relationship and its interpretation  
￿ extrapolation of results to impact policy  
These are discussed in consecutive sub-sections below. 
ANALYSIS 
Multivariate regression techniques are almost always preferred over simpler 





technology adoption link.  A major reason for this is that property rights are often 
associated with other plot and household characteristics so that simple comparisons of 
adoption under different property rights will likely bias the strength of the relationship.  
Technology adoption is almost always in the form of a limited dependent variable.  
Where it is binary, a logit or probit regression model is appropriate.  Where adoption 
values may take many positive values (e.g. level of adoption), a tobit model is normally 
appropriate.  If adoption is measured by proportion of area under the technology, 
truncated models should be used instead.  Maddala (1983) provides a highly readable 
introduction to these cases, while other authors (e.g. Greene 1993) may provide more 
accessible treatments of the underlying econometrics. 
Two complications to this methodological approach are the observance of 
multiple technologies and the endogeneity of property rights.  Many studies of 
technology adoption find several technologies of interest.  In many cases, there are clear 
conceptual relationships between different technologies, e.g. terracing and tree crops, 
zero grazing and improved fodder, and water wells and fencing.  When the number of 
individual lined technologies is small, or if some grouping of technologies can be made, a 
multinomial logit regression analysis can be used.  If there is a large number of 
technology variables, most studies have resorted to an assumption of independence 
between them and have used single equation models.  Simultaneous models involving 
limited dependent variables are not yet well developed and are not used in this literature.  
A study by Hayes et al. (1997) though, applied a two-stage procedure to tease out the 





When property rights both affect technology adoption and are affected by 
technology adoption, a simultaneous equation model is appropriate.  If the property rights 
and technology adoption variables are continuous, then the three-stage least-squares 
estimation method can be used.  This is rarely the case, however.  For limited dependent 
variables, single equation methods for handling endogeneity (such as two-stage least-
squares) have been utilized and techniques such as bootstrapping have been employed to 
correct for the resulting biases in estimated standard errors of coefficients (Braselle et al. 
1998; Baland et al. 1999).  The treatment of simultaneous equations consisting of limited 
dependent variables is neither well developed in this literature nor in other applications. 
An additional complication in the development of simultaneous models is that 
property rights and technology adoption are not always measured at the same unit of 
observation, a requirement in simultaneous equation models.  For example, land rights 
may be measured at a parcel level, while adoption of livestock technologies might be a 
farm level variable.  Similar difficulties have been noted in developing analytical 
methods for examining the effect of land titling (parcel level) on crop productivity (field 
level) or use of credit (farm level) (Place and Migot-Adholla 1998). 
Notwithstanding the discussion above, there are some instances where simpler, 
non-econometric techniques are preferable.  One is where investments show little 
variation in a plot or household level survey.  Thus, econometric models for qualitative 
variables do not always work, nor are they appropriate.  Sometimes simpler decision trees 
(diagrammatic descriptions of relationships among discrete choice variables) will be able 
explain a substantial proportion of the different outcomes.  For example, it may be that 





tree can show the patterns of these recursive relationships more clearly and powerfully 
than can econometric results.  
INTERPRETATION 
When faced with a situation where the majority of technologies are not found to 
vary much, researchers may be tempted to aim their attention on those few that do lend 
themselves to further analysis.  This is of course legitimate.  However, when making 
conclusions, researchers must remember to re-examine the totality of investments.  For 
instance, if property rights were found to impact on 1 or 2 types of land investments, but 5 
other similar investments were found to be present on nearly all fields/farms, what is the 
appropriate conclusion?  The role of property rights will be overstated if only those 
investments exhibiting variation across the observational units are considered. 
Finding a statistically significant result on a property rights variable is not the end 
of the analysis.  Evaluating the magnitude of the coefficient is the second step in ascertaining 
whether or not a variable has a significant impact on technology adoption.  Since property 
rights variables will often be of a binary nature, the size of the coefficient will directly reflect 
the impact of observing or not observing the specific property rights variable.  
Relating back to Section 1, the results should be interpreted in light of the 
objectives of the study.  If the study is based on a stratified sample using adoption of the 
technology as a criterion, then this must be kept in mind when interpreting marginal 
impacts.  For instance, the sample rate of adoption will be over-stated in such a 





One last point on interpretation is that it may be wise in some instances to interact 
property rights variables with others to improve understanding.  For example, property 
rights impacts may manifest themselves in different ways in different circumstances.  For 
example, rights of sale may only be important in peri-urban areas so interacting this 
property rights variable with another indicating peri-urban location or not can provide 
additional clarification as to the circumstances under which the property rights effect holds.   
PROVIDING INPUT INTO POLICY DISCUSSIONS 
The finding that property rights may impact on technology adoption does not 
necessarily suggest changes to the property rights systems.  It may be much simpler and 
more effective to alter certain characteristics of the technologies to enhance their 
adoptability under existing property rights.  There are other reasons to pause before 
making policy recommendations from such studies.  While case studies may have direct 
policy relevance at the study site, wider policy relevance of the research depends on the 
ability to draw wider implications from the study.  Do the conclusions hold for more 
aggregated spatial scales?  Are the conclusions based on a comprehensive evaluation of 
the impacts of property rights or only on certain impacts (e.g. efficiency only or equity 
only)?  These are critical for it must be kept in mind that there are costs associated with 
property rights change.    
If properly done, useful recommendations can be made to policy makers who 
have influence at the study site(s).  However, most researchers would hope that their 
results could have influence well beyond the boundaries of their study sites.  Working 





varying customary practices, formal rules and institutions, and by hosts of intervention 
organizations, such as development agencies.  Thus, types of land acquisition methods 
and rights over resources may be quite uniquely defined within local areas.  To find basis 
for comparison and extrapolation, it may be necessary to find common characteristics of 
rights and acquisition methods.  For example, what might be defined as renting may 
actually differ significantly from site to site.  Components of the rental method of 
accessing land, such as the formalization of the agreement, duration, relationship between 
transactors, and payment and other considerations exchanged are the types of variables 
that can be used to reconcile types of acquisitions across sites.  It may well be that one or 
more of these components of renting are more important for technology adoption, than 
the more aggregate and blunt ‘renting’ variable. 
Because property rights systems are fundamental to the pursuit of economic 
growth, equity, and sustainability, studies that focus only on the property rights-
technology adoption link are generally modest in their policy recommendations.  Two 
aspects of policy implication analyses could be strengthened.  First, it is often presumed 
that more incidence of a technology is better, but the links between technology adoption 
and the wider goals of economic growth, equity, and sustainability are not often clearly 
elaborated.  Second, the sequencing of complementary property rights interventions or 
between property rights and other policy options are not usually explored.  These 






6.   DEALING WITH THE COMPLEXITY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS AND 
TECHNOLOGY ADOPTION 
This review covered several conceptual and empirical aspects associated with the 
study of the relationships between property rights and technology adoption in smallholder 
agriculture.  Most of the discussion stems from the most general point of the paper, that 
the study of property rights and their effects is very complex.  There is complexity in 
conceptualizing the important aspects of property rights and, once defined, in measuring 
them.  Further complications in the study of property rights and their relationships with 
technology adoption arise because the different reasons for undertaking such studies lead 
to different research methodologies.  Finally, property rights are often dynamic and 
related to other variables, including technology adoption, so that the isolation and 
quantification of direct and indirect effects between property rights and other variables is 
complicated from an empirical point of view.  This paper has briefly referenced a number 
of other studies that have attempted to deal with portions of this complexity.  The main 
recommendation of this paper is that this body of research must be reviewed prior to the 
launching of new studies on property rights and their relationships with agricultural 
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